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A second sentence for Midekh
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1 # quotes from Karl Marx
2
3 {#OJQ}
4 ## from _On the Jewish Question_{as=cite}[^Easton1967]
5
6 {as=details}
7 ::::::::::::
8 {as=summary}
9 (Regarding this essay…)
10
11 I think it’s pretty clear, when you take it in context, that what Marx
12 is doing here is effectively saying “ah, you who think you hate the
13 Jews! you fools! what you really hate is capitalism!”, but it’s still
14 very uncomfortable at times reading him effectively arguing with
15 proto·Nazis using their own language and arguments.
16 This is unfortunate because the first section otherwise has a number of
17 choice critiques of the liberal state and its limitations, reproduced
18 below.
19 If you plan on reading this essay, I do recommend sticking to that
20 section, and skipping the second part (which has little to offer and
21 is more overt in its anti·Semitic rhetoric). [][@:Lady]{.sig}
22 ::::::::::::
23
24 {as=figure}
25 ::::::::::::::::::::::::::
26 > Only in the free states of North America—or at least in some of
27 > them—does the Jewish question lose its _theological_ significance
28 > and become a truly _secular_ question.
29 > Only where the political state exists in its complete development can
30 > the relation of the Jew, and generally speaking the religious man,
31 > to the political state, that is, the relation of religion to state,
32 > appear in its characteristic and pure form.
33 > Criticism of this relation ceases to be theological once the state
34 > abandons a _theological_ posture toward religion, once it relates
35 > itself to religion as a state, that is, _politically_.
36 > Criticism then becomes _criticism of the political state_.
37 > Where the question here ceases to be _theological_, Bauer’s criticism
38 > ceases to be critical.
39 > “_In the United States there is neither a state religion, nor a
40 > religion declared to be that of the majority, nor a pre‐eminence of
41 > one faith over another.
42 > The state is foreign to all faiths._”
43 > (Gustave de Beaumont, _Marie ou l’esclavage aux
44 > Etats‐Unis_:nbsp:.:nbsp:.:nbsp:. [Brussels, 1835], p. 214.)
45 > There are even some states in North America where “_the constitution
46 > imposes no religious beliefs or sectarian practice as the condition
47 > of political rights_” (_loc. cit._{as=i} p. 225).
48 > Yet “_no one in the United States believes that a man without
49 > religion can be an honest man_” (_loc. cit._{as=i} p. 224).
50 > And North America is pre‐eminently the land of religiosity as
51 > Beaumont, Tocqueville, and the Englishman Hamilton assure us
52 > unanimously.
53 > The North American states, however, serve only as an example.
54 > The question is:
55 > What is the relation of _complete_ political emancipation to
56 > religion?
57 > {=If we find even in a country with full political emancipation that
58 > religion not only _exists_ but is _fresh_ and _vital_, we have
59 > proof that the existence of religion is not incompatible with the
60 > full development of the state.=}
61 > But since the existence of religion implies a defect, the source of
62 > this defect must be sought in the _nature_ of the state itself.
63 > We no longer take religion to be the _basis_ but only the
64 > _manifestation_ of secular narrowness.
65 > Hence we explain religious restriction of free citizens on the basis
66 > of their secular restriction.
67 > We do not claim that they must trancend their religious resriction in
68 > order to trancend their secular limitations.
69 > We do claim that they will trancend their religious restriction once
70 > they have trancended their secular limitations.
71 > We do not convert secular questions into theological ones.
72 > We convert theological questions into secular questions.
73 > {=History has long enough been resolved into superstition, but now we
74 > can resolve superstition into history.=}
75 > The question of the _relation of political emancipation to religion_
76 > becomes for us a question of the _relation of political
77 > emancipation to human emancipation_.
78 > We criticize the religious weaknesses of the political state by
79 > criticizing the political state in its _secular_ construction
80 > _apart from_ the religious defects.
81 > In human terms we resolve the contradiction between the state and a
82 > _particular religion_ such as _Judaism_ into the contradiction
83 > between the state and _particular secluar_ elements, the
84 > contradiciton bewteen the state and _religion generally_ into the
85 > contradiction between the state and its _presuppositions_.
86 >
87 > The _political_ emancipation of the Jew, the Christian, or the
88 > _religious_ man generally is the _emancipation of the state_ from
89 > Judaism, from Christianity, from _religion_ in general.
90 > In a form and manner corresponding to its nature, the _state_ as such
91 > emancipates itself from religion by emancipating itself from the
92 > _state religion_, that is, by recognizing no religion and
93 > recognizing itself simply as the state.
94 > _Political_ emancipation from religion is not complete and consistent
95 > emancipation from religion because {=political emancipation is not
96 > the complete and consistent form of _human_ emancipation=}.
97 >
98 > The limits of political emancipation are seen at once in the fact
99 > that {=the _state_ can free itself from a limitation without man
100 > _actually_ being free from it=}, in the fact that {=a state can be
101 > a _free state_ without men becoming _free men_=}.
102 > Bauer himself tacitly admits this in setting the following condition
103 > of political emancipation:
104 > “Every religious privilege, including the monopoly of a privileged
105 > church, would have to be abolished. If a few or many or even the
106 > _overwhelming majority still felt obliged to fulfill their
107 > religious duties_, such a practice should be left to them as a
108 > _purely private matter_.”
109 > The _state_ can thus emancipate itself from religion even though the
110 > _overwhelming majority_ is still religious.
111 > And the overwhelming majority does not cease being religious by being
112 > religious _in private_.
113 >
114 > But the attitude of the state, particularly the _free state_, toward
115 > religion is still only the attitude of the _men_ who make up the
116 > state.
117 > Hence it follows that man frees himself from a limitation
118 > politically, through the state, by overcoming the limitation in an
119 > _abstract_, _limited_, and partial manner, in contradiction with
120 > himself.
121 > Further, when man frees himself _politically_, he does so
122 > _indirectly_, through an _intermediary_, even if the _intermediary_
123 > is _necessary_.
124 > Finally, even when man proclaims himself an atheist through the
125 > medium of the state—that is, when he declares the state to be
126 > atheistic—he is still captive to religion since he only recognizes
127 > his atheism indirectly through an intermediary.
128 > Religion is merely the indirect recognition of man through a
129 > _mediator_.
130 > The state is the mediator between man and the freedom of man.
131 > As Christ is the mediator on whom man unburdens all his own divinity
132 > and all his _religious ties_, so is the state the mediator to which
133 > man transfers all his unholiness and all his _human freedom_.
134 >
135 > The _political_ elevation of man above religion shares all the
136 > defects and all the advantages of any political elevation.
137 > If the state as state, for example, abolishes _private property_, man
138 > proclaims private property is _overcome politically_ once he
139 > abolishes the property qualification for active and passive voting
140 > as has been done in many North American states.
141 > _Hamilion_ interprets this fact quite correctly in political terms:
142 > “_The great majority of the people have gained a victory over
143 > property owners and financial wealth._”^[*]^
144 > Is not private property ideally abolished when the have‐nots come to
145 > legislate for the haves?
146 > The _property qualification_ is the last _political_ form for
147 > recognizing private property.
148 >
149 > Yet {=the political annulment of private property not only does not
150 > abolish it but even presupposes it.=}
151 > The state abolishes distinctions of _birth_, _rank_, _education_, and
152 > _occupation_ in its fashion when it declares them to be
153 > _non‐political_ distinctions, when it proclaims that every member
154 > of the community _equally_ participates in popular sovereignty
155 > without regard to these distinctions, and when it deals with all
156 > elements of the actual life of the nation from the standpoint of
157 > the state.
158 > {=Nevertheless the state permits private property, education, and
159 > occupation to _act_ and manifest their _particular_ nature as
160 > private property, education, and occupation in their _own_ ways.=}
161 > Far from overcoming these _factual_ distinctions, the state exists
162 > only by presupposing them; it is aware of itself as a _political
163 > state_ and makes its _universality_ effective only in opposition to
164 > these elements.
165 >
166 > [[*Thomas Hamilton, _Men and Manners in America_{as=cite} (2 vols;
167 > Edinburgh: Willam Blackwood, 1833).
168 > Marx quotes from the German translation, _Die Menschen und die Sitten
169 > in den Vereinigten Staaten von Nordamerika_{as=cite lang=de}
170 > (Mannheim: Hoff, 1834), Vol Ⅰ, p. 146.]]{as=small}
171
172 {as=figcaption}
173 :::::::::::::::
174 The liberal state frames aspects of human life as “nonpolitical” as a
175 way of _upholding_, not _challenging_ them.
176 A proper liberatory state must frontally grapple with human life in all
177 its complexities, rather than simply writing off such things as
178 property ownership as an “apolitical” distinction.
179
180 Either the personal is political, or politics is insufficient for
181 human liberation.
182 :::::::::::::::
183 ::::::::::::::::::::::::::
184
185 {as=figure}
186 ::::::::::::::::::::::::::
187 > According to Baeur man must sacrifice the “_privilege of faith_” to
188 > be able to acquire the universal rights of man.
189 > Let us consider for a moment these so‐called rights and indeed in
190 > their most authentic form, the form they have among their
191 > _discoverers_, the North Americans and the French.
192 > In part these rights are _political_ rights that can be exercised
193 > only in community with others.
194 > _Participation_ in the _community_, indeed the _political_ community
195 > or _state_, constitutes their substance.
196 > They belong in the category of _political freedom_, of _civil
197 > rights_, which by no means presupposes the consistent and positive
198 > trancendence of religion and thus of Judaism, as we have seen.
199 > There is left for consideration the other part, the _rights of man_
200 > as distinct from the _rights of the citizen_.
201 >
202 > Among these is freedom of conscience, the right to practice one’s
203 > chosen religion.
204 > The _privilege of faith_ is expressly recognized either as a _right
205 > of man_ or as a consequence of a right of man, freedom.
206 >
207 > > _Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen_{as=cite},
208 > > 1791, Art. 10:
209 > > “No one is to be disturbed on account of his beliefs, even
210 > > religious beliefs.”
211 > > In Title Ⅰ of the Constitution of 1791 there is guaranteed as a
212 > > human right:
213 > > “The liberty of every man to practice the _religious worship_ to
214 > > which he is attached.”
215 > >
216 > > The _Declaration of the Rights of Man_{as=cite}, etc., 1793,
217 > > includes among human richts, Art. 7:
218 > > “Freedom of worship.”
219 > > Moreover, it even maintains in regard to the right to express views
220 > > and opinions, to assemble, and to worship:
221 > > “The need to proclaim these _rights_ assumes either the presence or
222 > > recent memory of despotism.”
223 > > Compare the Constitution of 1795, Title ⅩⅠⅤ, Art. 354.
224 > >
225 > > _Constitution of Pennsylvania_{as=cite}, Art. 9, § 3:
226 > > “All men have a natural and indefeasible _right_ to worship
227 > > Almighty God according to the dictates of their own consciences;
228 > > no man can of right be compelled to attend, erect, or support any
229 > > place of worship, or to maintain any ministry against his
230 > > consent; no human authority can, in any case whatever, interfere
231 > > with the rights of conscience and control the prerogatives of the
232 > > soul.”
233 > >
234 > > _Constitution of New Hampshire_{as=cite}, Arts. 5 and 6:
235 > > “Among the natural rights, some are in their very nature
236 > > unalienable, because no equivalent can be conceived for them.
237 > > Of this kind are the _rights_ of conscience.”
238 > > (Beaumont, _loc. cit._{as=i}, pp. 213, 214.)
239 >
240 > The incompatibility between religion and the rights of man is so
241 > little implied in the concept of the rights of man that the _right
242 > to be religious_ according to one’s liking and to practice a
243 > particular religion is explicitly included among the rights of man.
244 > The _privilege of faith_ is a universal human right.
245 >
246 > The _rights of man_ as such are distinguished from the _rights of the
247 > citizen_.
248 > Who is this _man_ distinguished from the _citizen_?
249 > None other than the _member of civil society_.
250 > {=Why is the member of the civil society called “man,” man without
251 > qualification, and why are his rights called the _rights of man_?=}
252 > How can we explain this?
253 > By the relation of the political state to civil society and by the
254 > nature of political emancipation.
255 >
256 > Let us note first of all that the so‐called _rights of man_ as
257 > distinguished from the _rights of the citizen_ are only the rights
258 > of the _member of civil society_, that is, of egoistic man, man
259 > separated from other men and from the community.
260 > The most radical constitution, the Constitution of 1793, may be
261 > quoted:
262 >
263 > > _Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen._{as=i}
264 > >
265 > > _Art. 2._{as=i}
266 > > “These rights (the natural and imprescriptible rights) are:
267 > > _equality_, _liberty_, _security_, _property_.”
268 >
269 > What is this _liberty_?
270 >
271 > > _Art 6._{as=i}
272 > > “Liberty is the power belonging to each man to do anything which
273 > > does not impair the rights of others,” or according to the
274 > > Declaration of the Rights of Man of 1791:
275 > > “Liberty is the power to do anything which does not harm others.”
276 >
277 > Liberty is thus the right to do and perform anything that does not
278 > harm others.
279 > {=The limits within which each can act _without harming_ others is
280 > determined by law just as the boundary between two fields is marked
281 > by a stake.=}
282 > This is the liberty of man viewed as an isolated monad, withdrawn
283 > into himself.
284 > Why, according to Bauer, is the Jew not capable of acquiring human
285 > rights?
286 > “As long as he remains a Jew the limited nature which makes him a Jew
287 > must triumph over the human nature which should link him as a man
288 > with others and must separate him from non‐Jews.”
289 > {=But liberty as a right of man is not based on the association of
290 > man with man but rather on the separation of man from man.=}
291 > It is the _right_ of this separation, the right of the _limited_
292 > individual limited to himself.
293 >
294 > The practical application of the right of liberty is the right of
295 > _private property_.
296 >
297 > What is property as one of the rights of man?
298 >
299 > > _Art. 16_{as=i} (Constitution of 1793):
300 > >
301 > > “The right of _property_ is that belonging to every citizen to
302 > > enjoy and dispose of his goods, his revenues, the fruits of his
303 > > labor and of his industry as he wills.”
304 >
305 > The right of property is thus the right to enjoy and dispose of one’s
306 > possessions as one wills, without regard for other men and
307 > independently of society.
308 > It is the right of self‐interest.
309 > This individual freedom and its application as well constitutes the
310 > basis of civil society.
311 > It lets every man find in other men not the _realization_ but rather
312 > the _limitation_ of his own freedom.
313 > It proclaims above all the right of man “to enjoy and dispose of his
314 > goods, his revenues, the fruits of his labor and of his industry
315 > _as he wills_.”
316 >
317 > There still remain the other rights of man, equality and security.
318 >
319 > “Equality”—here used in its non‐political sense—is only the equal
320 > right to _liberty_ as described above, viz., that every man is
321 > equally viewed as a self‐sufficient monad.
322 > The Constitution of 1705 defines the concept of equality with this
323 > significance:
324 >
325 > > _Art. 3_{as=i} (Constitution of 1795):
326 > > “Equality consists in the fact that the law is the same for all,
327 > > whether it protects or whether it punishes.”
328 >
329 > And security?
330 >
331 > > _Art. 8_{as=i} (Constitution of 1793):
332 > > “Security consists in the protection accorded by society to each of
333 > > its members for the preservation of his person, his rights and
334 > > his property.”
335 >
336 > {=_Security_ is the supreme social concept of civil society, the
337 > concept of the _police_, the concept that the whole society exists
338 > only to guarantee to each of its members the preservation of his
339 > person, his rights, and his property.=}
340 > In this sense Hegel calls civil society “the state as necessity and
341 > rationality.”
342 >
343 > Civil society does not raise itself above its egoism through the
344 > concept of security.
345 > Rather, security is the _guarantee_ of the egoism.
346 >
347 > {=Thus none of the so‐called rights of men goes beyond the egoistic
348 > man, the man withdrawn into himself, his private interest and his
349 > private choice, and separated from the community as a member of
350 > civil society.=}
351 > Far from viewing man here in his species‐being, his species‐life
352 > itself—society—rather appears to be an external framework for the
353 > individual, limiting his original independence.
354 > The only bond between men is natural necessity, need and private
355 > interest, the maintenance of their property and egoistic persons.
356 >
357 > It is somewhat curious that a nation just beginning to free itself,
358 > tearing down all the barriers between different sections of the
359 > people and founding a political community, should solemnly proclaim
360 > (Declaration of 1791) the justification of the egoistic man, man
361 > separated from his fellow men and from the community, and should
362 > even repeat this proclamation at a moment when only the most
363 > heroic sacrifice can save the nation and hence is urgently
364 > required, when the sacrifice of all the interests of civil society
365 > is highly imperaive and egoism must be punished as crime
366 > (Declaration of the Rights of Man of 1793).
367 > This becomes even more curious when we observe that the political
368 > liberators reduce citizenship, the _political community_, to a mere
369 > _means_ for preserving these so‐called rights of man and that the
370 > citizen thus is proclaimed to be the servant of the egoistic man,
371 > the sphere in which the man acts as a member of the community is
372 > degraded below that in which he acts as a fractional being, and
373 > finally man as bourgeios rather than man as citizen is considered
374 > to be _proper_ and _authentic_ man.
375 >
376 > “The _goal_ of all _political association_ is the _preservation_ of
377 > the natural and imprescriptible rights of man.”
378 > (Declaration of the Rights of Man, etc., of 1791, Art. 2.)
379 > “_Government_ is instituted to guarantee man’s enjoyment of his
380 > natural and imprescriptible rights.”
381 > (Declaration, etc., of 1793, Art. 1.)
382 > Thus even at the time of its youthful enthusiasm fired by the urgency
383 > of circumstances political life is proclaimed to be a mere _means_
384 > whose end is life in civil society.
385 > To be sure, {=revolutionary practice flagrantly contradicts its
386 > theory=}.
387 > While security, for example, is proclaimed to be one of the rights of
388 > man, the violation of the privacy of correspondance is publicly
389 > established as the order of the day.
390 > While the “_unlimited_ freedom of the press” (Constitution of 1973,
391 > Art. 122) as a consequence of the rights of man and individual
392 > freedom is guaranteed, freedom of the press is completely abolished
393 > because “freedom of the press should not be permitted to compromise
394 > public liberty.”
395 > (“Robespierre jeune,” _Parliamentary History of the French
396 > Revolution_{as=cite}, by Buchez and Roux, Vol. 28, p. 159.)
397 > This means that the human right of liberty ceases to be a right when
398 > it comes into conflict with _political_ life while theoretically
399 > political life is only the guarantee of the rights of man, the
400 > rights of individual man, and should be abandoned once it
401 > contradicts its _end_, these rights of man.
402 > But the practice is only the exception, the theory is the rule.
403 > Even if we choose to regard revolutionary practice as the correct
404 > expression of this relationship, the problem still remains
405 > unsettled as to why the relationship is inverted in the
406 > consciousness of the political liberators so that the end appears
407 > as means and the means as the end.
408 > This optical illusion of their consciousness would always be the same
409 > problem, though a psychological, a theoretical problem.
410
411 {as=figcaption}
412 :::::::::::::::
413 “Civil” (bourgeois, liberal) society seeks to uphold the rights of
414 the individual at the expense of the collective, which not only is
415 nonpractice·able from a revolutionary standpoint (as revolution
416 depends on collective action at the expense of individual liberty)
417 but also, and more importantly, forms a reductive model of humanity
418 which negates social forces, interactions, and community (including
419 political community [hence the contradiction]).
420
421 Socialist society, in contrast, upholds the rights of humanity _as
422 members of society_ over their rights as individuals; this is what
423 distinguishes left socialism from left liberalism (and leaves
424 socialism and libertarianism fundamentally at odds with each other).
425 :::::::::::::::
426 ::::::::::::::::::::::::::
427
428 {as=figure}
429 ::::::::::::::::::::::::::
430 > This _man_, the member of civil society, is now the basis and
431 > presupposition of the _political state_.
432 > He is recognized as such by the state in the rights of man.
433 >
434 > {=But the freedom of egoistic man and the recognition of this freedom
435 > is rather the recognition of the _unbridled_ movement of the
436 > sprirtual and material elements forming the content of his life.=}
437 >
438 > {=Thus man was not freed from religion; he received religious
439 > freedom.
440 > He was not freed from property.
441 > He received freedom of property.
442 > He was not freed from the egoism of trade but received freedom to
443 > trade.=}
444 >
445 > The _constitution_ of the _political state_ and the dissolution of
446 > civil society into independent _individuals_—whose relation is
447 > _law_ just as the relation of estates and guilds was
448 > _privilege_—is accomplished in _one and the same act_.
449 > As a member of civil society man is the _non‐political man_ but
450 > necessarily appears to be _natural_ man.
451 > The _rights of man_ appear to be _natural rights_ because
452 > _self‐conscious activity_ is concentrated on the _political act_.
453 > The _egoistic_ man is the _passive_ and _given_ result of the
454 > dissolved society, an object of _immediate certainty_ and thus a
455 > _natural_ object.
456 > {=The _political revolution_ dissolves civil life into its constituent
457 > elements without _revolutionizing_ these elements themselves and
458 > subjecting them to criticism.=}
459 > It regards civil society—the realm of needs, labor, private
460 > interests, and private right—as the _basis of its existence_, as a
461 > _presupposition_ needing no ground, and thus as its _natural
462 > basis_.
463 > Finally, man as a member of civil society is regarded as _authentic_
464 > man, _man_ as distinct from _citizen_, since he is man in his
465 > sensuous, individual, and _most intimate_ existence while
466 > _political_ man is only the abstract and artificial man, man as an
467 > _allegorical_, _moral_ person.
468 > Actual man is recognized only in the form of an _egoistic_
469 > individual, _authentic_ man, only in the form of _abstract
470 > citizen_.
471
472 {as=figcaption}
473 :::::::::::::::
474 The creation and conceptualization of the political state has
475 politicized community, afflicting it with the veneer of artificiality
476 and cementing individualistic, egoistic, asocial life as “natural”.
477 :::::::::::::::
478 ::::::::::::::::::::::::::
479
480 (This quote is interesting as it seems to predict and also complicate
481 Foucault’s analysis of the state as an imposition of regulatory and
482 normativising knowledge on a sensual world of pleasures.
483 In fact the sensual world of pleasures Foucault imagines is, ⅌ Marx, a
484 _product of_ the existence of a liberal state order which views, and
485 depends _in its very essence_ on such a view, “private” acts as
486 natural and beyond critique.
487 It does not precede it.
488 [][@:Lady]{.sig})
489
490 ## from _On Proudhon_{as=cite}[^DSD161718]
491
492 {as=figure}
493 ::::::::::::::::::::::::::
494 > But in spite of all his apparent iconoclasm one already finds in
495 > _Qu’est-ce que la propriété_{as="cite" lang="fr"}? the
496 > contradiction that Proudhon is
497 > criticising society, on the one hand, from the standpoint and with
498 > the eyes of a French small-holding peasant (later
499 > _petit bourgeois_{as="i" lang="fr"})
500 > and, on the other, that he measures it with the standards he
501 > inherited from the socialists.
502 >
503 > The deficiency of the book is indicated by its very title.
504 > The question is so badly formulated that it cannot be answered
505 > correctly.
506 > _Ancient “property relations”_ were superseded by _feudal_ property
507 > relations and these by “_bourgeois_” property relations.
508 > Thus history itself had expressed its criticism upon past
509 > _property
510 > relations_.
511 > What Proudhon was actually dealing with was _modern bourgeois
512 > property_ as it exists today.
513 > The question of what this is could have only been answered by a
514 > critical analysis of “_political economy_,” embracing the totality
515 > of
516 > these _property relations_, considering not their _legal_ aspect
517 > as
518 > _relations of volition_ but their real form, that is, as
519 > _relations of
520 > production_.
521 > But as Proudhon entangled the whole of these economic relations in
522 > the general legal concept of “_property_,”
523 > “_la propriété_{as="i" lang="fr"},” he could
524 > not get beyond the answer which, in a similar work published before
525 > 1789, Brissot had already given in the same words: “_La propriété
526 > c’est le vol._{as="i" lang="fr"}”
527 >
528 > The upshot is at best that the bourgeois legal conceptions of
529 > “_theft_” apply equally well to the “_honest_” gains of the
530 > bourgeois
531 > himself.
532 > On the other hand, since “_theft_” as a forcible violation of
533 > property _presupposes the existence of property_, Proudhon
534 > entangled
535 > himself in all sorts of fantasies, obscure even to himself, about
536 > _true bourgeois property_.
537 {as=figcaption}
538 :::::::::::::::
539 “What is property?” is a bad question;
540 Proudhon’s answer, “Property is theft!”, presupposes property.
541 :::::::::::::::
542 ::::::::::::::::::::::::::
543
544 When writing _Oppenheimer_{as="cite"}, Christopher Nolan apparently
545 believed that two people who have both ostensibly read the entirety
546 of _Capital_{as="cite"} would both attribute “Property is theft!” to
547 Marx.
548 [][@:Aescling]{.sig}
549
550 [^Easton1967]:
551 Translated by Loyd D Easton and Kurt H Guddat, © 1967.
552
553 [^DSD161718]:
554 From _Der Social-Demokrat_ Nos. 16, 17, and 18; as
555 [republished](https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1865/letters/65_01_24.htm)
556 by Marxists.org
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